Diplomatic and operational power struggles shape TRIPP

YEREVAN — The struggle over TRIPP is no longer confined to diplomatic statements. Last week, representatives of the U.S. engineering and consulting company AECOM traveled to Armenia and examined the proposed route with Armenian government officials. According to the U.S. Embassy in Yerevan, the team surveyed the site in preparation for designing railway and other infrastructure. The visit marked a significant change in the project’s status. TRIPP — the “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity” — is beginning to move from political language toward technical planning. Today, the Armenian government is expected to consider approving the ratification of a strategic cooperation framework agreement concerning the project. The Armenia-U.S. agreement was signed in Yerevan on June 4, and the ratification proposal has been placed on the government’s agenda as an unreported item. At the same time, Azerbaijan says it is being kept informed about the negotiations. Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov said discussions were continuing between Armenia and the United States and that the project was now in the document-preparation phase. “The entry and exit points of the TRIPP route are located on Azerbaijani territory, so our American partners keep us informed,” Bayramov said. These developments suggest the project is advancing more quickly than the public debate surrounding its legal and political implications. Yet the parties still do not appear to share a single understanding of what is being built — or of who will ultimately control it. A Road, a corridor or a new political system? Armenian officials describe TRIPP as a road and railway connection operating through sovereign Armenian territory. Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev continues to refer to the same project as the “Zangezur Corridor.” A road through Armenia would normally remain subject to Armenian law, customs procedures, policing and border controls. A corridor, particularly as the term has been used by Azerbaijani officials, suggests a route with special guarantees or a status that limits Armenia’s ability to regulate traffic passing between Azerbaijan and Nakhichevan. Aliyev has presented the project as a strategic connection between the two parts of Azerbaijan. For Baku, the word “corridor” allows the Azerbaijani leadership to portray the route as the realization of a major postwar objective. A project can be called a road while functioning as a corridor if Armenian authorities lack meaningful control over customs, security, commercial management or the interruption of transit.  The decisive question, therefore, is not what the route is called, but what the agreements allow Armenia to do. Azerbaijan is outside the agreement — but inside the process Bayramov’s statement offers an important insight into the structure of the negotiations. The principal discussions are taking place between Armenia and the United States. This arrangement gives the United States a central coordinating role. Washington is not simply encouraging Armenia and Azerbaijan to reopen communications. It appears to be involved in the project’s planning, documentation and potential implementation. Once technical plans, railway alignments and operating models begin to take shape, political ambiguities can become embedded in concrete, contracts and institutional structures. The question of ownership According to an analysis published by Al-Monitor, the company established to implement the project is expected to be 74% owned by the United States and 26% owned by Armenia. If that structure is confirmed, it would intensify debate over the distinction between legal sovereignty and operational control. Foreign investment or majority ownership would not automatically remove the route from Armenian jurisdiction. International companies routinely build and operate infrastructure inside sovereign states. But TRIPP is not an ordinary commercial road. It would cross one of Armenia’s most sensitive regions, connect Azerbaijan with Nakhichevan, run close to the Iranian border and potentially become a central element of a wider Turkish-Azerbaijani transport network. Under those circumstances, ownership matters. The ownership structure also complicates Armenian efforts to reassure Iran. Tehran may accept formal assurances that Armenia’s borders will not change. It is less likely to be reassured by a model in which a U.S.-controlled company manages strategic infrastructure immediately north of Iranian territory. Iran wants more than assurances The Armenian-Iranian border is only 44 kilometers long, yet it is strategically important to both countries. For Armenia, Iran provides an alternative route to the outside world in a region where the Turkish and Azerbaijani borders have historically been closed. For Iran, the Armenian connection offers access toward Georgia and the Black Sea while providing strategic leverage in relation to Azerbaijan, a close partner of Israel. Tehran fears the route could reduce the importance of this border, expand Turkish-Azerbaijani influence and establish a long-term American presence close to Iranian territory. During a recent meeting with Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian cautioned against allowing powers from outside the region to influence Armenian-Iranian relations. Although he did not refer to TRIPP by name, the warning was widely understood in the context of the U.S.-backed transport initiative. Iran’s ambassador to Armenia, Khalil Shirgolami, later said the two governments must develop mechanisms for managing the risks that could arise from TRIPP’s implementation. S Against that background, Shirgolami said Iran’s unease over a possible American presence near its borders should be treated as a legitimate security concern requiring a substantive response. Iranian officials and experts have also delivered warnings directly to Armenian opposition politicians. Levon Zurabyan, vice chairman of the Armenian National Congress, said that during meetings in Iran, both official and expert circles advised Armenia against following TRIPP-related arrangements that conflict with Iranian interests. According to Zurabyan, Tehran indicated that such decisions could have consequences. At the same time, Tehran is seeking to deepen its institutional relationship with Yerevan through a planned strategic partnership agreement. The 3+3 alternative Even as Azerbaijan supports a U.S.-backed project, Aliyev continues to promote the regional 3+3 cooperation format involving Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Iran, Russia and Turkey. Georgia has not joined the initiative, leaving it to operate in practice as a five-party framework. Aliyev has argued that the format should address the problems of the entire region rather than becoming another mechanism focused narrowly on Armenia and Azerbaijan. He has also said that a meeting among the participating countries — at least at the level of foreign ministers — would be useful if other capitals shared Baku’s understanding. TRIPP places the United States at the center of a strategic transport project. The 3+3 framework emphasizes solutions developed by the region’s own states, including Iran, Russia and Turkey. Azerbaijan appears willing to participate in both models. This may be a form of geopolitical hedging. Baku can benefit from U.S. investment and guarantees while maintaining cooperative mechanisms with Moscow, Tehran and Ankara. Armenia has less room for maneuver. It must navigate the contradictions between these competing frameworks. Iran and Russia may eventually seek to use the 3+3 format to influence TRIPP’s implementation or limit the American role. Turkey and Azerbaijan may use the same forum to consolidate the route’s place within a broader east-west transport system. The questions the agreement must answer The Armenia-U.S. framework agreement and the documents now being prepared will need to establish whether the project can function without creating a permanent exception to Armenian sovereign authority. Jurisdiction must be unambiguous.  Customs arrangements must identify who inspects cargo and travelers, which procedures apply. Any role assigned to foreign companies, contractors or security personnel must be publicly defined and remain subordinate to Armenian state institutions. Reciprocity will be equally important. Armenia must receive guaranteed transport access and measurable economic benefits rather than merely providing the territory through which Azerbaijan and Turkey connect to one another. The project must also preserve Armenia’s uninterrupted links with Iran. But even detailed agreements may not resolve the more fundamental problem. A route of this sensitivity cannot depend on political goodwill, verbal assurances or the expectation that future disputes will be handled differently from those of the recent past. It would require an enforceable dispute-resolution system capable of protecting Armenian authority. The absence of such guarantees raises doubts about whether the project can move beyond surveys, framework agreements and political declarations.  If the final arrangement requires Armenia to limit its own discretion to guarantee uninterrupted passage under all political circumstances, the result would be difficult to reconcile with the sovereignty the project is officially said to preserve. The post Diplomatic and operational power struggles shape TRIPP appeared first on The Armenian Weekly.